Young doctors’ preferences for payment systems: the influence of gender and personality traits by Abelsen, Birgit & Olsen, Jan Abel
Abelsen and Olsen Human Resources for Health  (2015) 13:69 
DOI 10.1186/s12960-015-0060-0RESEARCH Open AccessYoung doctors’ preferences for payment
systems: the influence of gender and
personality traits
Birgit Abelsen1* and Jan Abel Olsen2Abstract
Objective: Activity-based payment contracts are common among doctors, but to what extent are they preferred?
The aim of this paper is to elicit young doctors’ preferences for alternative payment systems before they have
adapted to an existing system. We examine the existence of gender differences and the extent to which
personality traits determine preferences.
Methods: A cross-sectional survey of all final-year medical students and all interns in Norway examined the extent
to which preferences for different payment systems depend on gender and personality traits. Data analysis relied
on one-way ANOVA and multinomial logistic regression.
Results: The current activity-based payment systems were the least preferred, both in hospitals (16.6%) and in
general practice (19.7%). The contrasting alternative “fixed salary” achieved similar relative support. Approximately
half preferred the hybrid alternative. When certainty associated with a payment system increased, its appeal rose for
women and individuals who are less prestige-oriented, risk-tolerant or effort-tolerant. Activity-based systems were
preferred among status- and income-oriented respondents.
Conclusion: The vast majority of young doctors prefer payment systems that are less activity-based than the current
contracts offered in the Norwegian health service. Recruitment and retention in less prestigious medical specialities
might improve if young doctors could choose payment systems corresponding with their diverse preferences.
Keywords: GP remuneration, Hospital payment systems, Preadapted payment preferences, Gender differences,
Personality traitsIntroduction
A common feature of most health systems is the exten-
sive use of activity-based payment contracts for doctors.
General practitioners (GPs) are often paid based on their
productivity (fee-for-service (FFS) and/or capitation),
and hospital doctors are accustomed to relatively high
additional payments on top of their base-level salary as
compensation for long and irregular hours [1]. While
doctors themselves might argue that their behaviour is
driven by professional ethics rather than by the payment
mechanism, economists would claim that payment struc-
tures influence behaviour [2]. FFS provides incentives to* Correspondence: birgit.abelsen@uit.no
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tion provides incentives to serve more patients but may
lead to underservice; salary provides limited incentives to
be productive as the doctor is paid the same regardless of
production (see, for example, [3]). More recently, the
health service has been influenced by an increased interest
in various pay-for-performance (“p4p”) models. However,
the notion that financial incentives can improve health
outcomes lacks clear evidence [4,5].
Functional payment systems are the results of negotia-
tions and expected to be approved, if not preferred, by
the members’ union (that is, the medical association).
There is, however, an important element of inertia in-
volved, as existing payment systems may reflect past
preferences from a time when doctors were men whose
norm was to work long hours while their wives tookis article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
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more women are entering the medical profession, and
the new generation of doctors prefer a different work–
life balance [7-11]. This is referred to as a generation
and gender shift in medicine [12] or the grand gender
conversion in the economic literature [13].
In addition, the doctor’s role in health care is chan-
ging. From being the curing star, the doctor is increas-
ingly becoming an integrated team member alongside
other skilled health care professionals [14]. This less au-
tonomous role of doctors makes the use of activity- or
performance-based payment systems more challenging.
In addition, team membership can free doctors from ir-
regular and long hours, as the team members to some
extent substitute each other [13].
The aim of the study reported from here was to elicit
young doctors’ preferences for different payment systems
before they adapt their preferences to an existing system.
More specifically, we examine (a) the existence of gender
differences in preferences for payment systems and (b) the
extent to which personality traits determine preferences
for a payment system. Finally, we discuss the extent to
which policy makers should respond to young doctors’
payment system preferences. The study provides new in-
sights for analysing professional labour markets, in which
heterogeneity in career interests is acknowledged.
Study context
The Norwegian payment systems for doctors are quite
similar to those of other OECD countries [1]. On the
primary health care level, the GPs act as gatekeepers,
that is, patients require a GP’s referral to access special-
ity care. A patient-list system gives all citizens the right
to sign up on a GP list. In 2014, the average number of
patients on such lists was 1150 .The vast majority of
Norwegian GPs have private practices and receive ap-
proximately one third of their incomes based on capita-
tion (flat rate per patient) paid by the municipalities and
the remaining two thirds based on FFS. The FFS scheme
is a mix of a fixed fee per consultation paid by patients
and variable fees paid by the government depending on
the following: the duration of the consultation, whether
certain types of examinations and laboratory tests are
initiated and whether the doctor is a specialist in general
medicine [15]. The payment system for doctors in hospi-
tals is salary-based and offers strong incentives for work-
ing irregular hours. On average, hospital doctors make an
additional 23% of their income from irregular hours and
overtime work (19% among women, 26% among men)
[16]. The hospitals operate on public budgets, and hospital
doctors are employed in local health authorities covered
by collective agreements. Wage-setting for employees cov-
ered by collective agreements takes place at two levels: na-
tional and firm. At the national level, wage regulations,working hours, working conditions, pensions and medical
benefits are negotiated. The firm-level negotiations deter-
mine possible local adjustments and additions to the col-
lective agreements [17].
Female doctors work on average 4 h less per week than
do male doctors [18]. Over the last decade, the number of
practising physicians has increased by 32%, while the pro-
portion of female doctors has increased from 36% to 46%
[19]. Due to the activity-based payment structure, the
GPs’ salaries are currently less predictable than hospital
doctors’ salaries. The GPs’ share of predictable income
could be seen as comprising one third of total income,
while the similar hospital doctors’ share comprise 77% of
total income. However, unlike many other OECD coun-
tries [1], the average payment levels are higher among
Norwegian GPs than among hospital doctors [20].
The Norwegian health care system is organized within
two sectors. Municipalities are responsible for primary
care, while specialist care is the responsibility of the state
(administered by four regional health authorities). The
two sectors have different funding mechanisms, as well
as different administrative, political and professional cul-
tures [21]. In the past few years, policy reforms have
been implemented to improve coordination and integra-
tion between provider levels to control rising costs.
Gender and personality traits
Several studies have shown that male physicians are
more externally motivated in their career choices by as-
pects of income, status and the opportunity to imple-
ment technical activities, whereas females are more
intrinsically motivated by humanist and altruistic aspects
[22,23]. Given that women tend to prefer more predict-
able income and fewer financial incentives than men
[24], we would expect female physicians to be less happy
with the current activity-based payment systems in gen-
eral practice. Given the increasing evidence that women
have stronger aversions than men to working long ir-
regular hours [13], we expect them to be even more re-
luctant to the current payment system in hospitals that
disproportionately rewards doctors who are prepared to
work accordingly. Furthermore, we expect a payment
system that involves disproportionate compensations for
sacrificing leisure time to conflict with the preferred
work–life balance of young doctors who have a family.
Based on previous research [20,24,25], we further ex-
pect the current payment systems to be preferred by
those having personality traits involving prestige-
orientation and status-seeking and by those who are
risk-tolerant, effort-tolerant and income-focused.
An early study on women in medicine showed that
women had chosen specialities that tended to have lower
prestige and lower income [26]. It was, however, unclear
whether certain specialities carry less prestige because
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shown that male physicians are more likely to choose
surgery as a speciality, whereas female physicians tend
to prefer general practice [27-30].
It is well known that the medical community (both
medical students and experienced physicians) assign dif-
ferent prestige to medical specialities [31-36]. A prestige
hierarchy has been developed to rank specialities and
subspecialities on a scale from 1 (geriatrics) to 22
(neurosurgery) [31,32,37]. General practice is ranked
near the bottom of this list (index 4). Studies on women
in medicine show that women compared to men tend to
choose specialities that have lower prestige and lower in-
come [11,26,27,38,39].
Based on the above, we expect the current activity-
based payment system in general practice to be relatively
less popular among women and risk-averse doctors. On
the contrary, we expect this system to be more popular
among income-oriented and effort-tolerant doctors. The
payment system in hospitals involving disproportionate
rewards for long and irregular hours is also expected to
be relatively less popular among women and particularly
so among those having a family. Doctors who are pres-
tige- and status-oriented are expected to approve of a
system that rewards their inclinations to work long and
irregular hours, something they consider to be required
for becoming a specialist at an early age.
Methods
A cross-sectional study was conducted at the end of 2010
among all last-year medical students and all interns in
Norway (n = 1562). Contact information was provided by
the four medical faculties and the organizers of internships
(local health authorities and county governor offices). The
information letter included a web link to an online ques-
tionnaire. Two reminders were mailed. The survey was re-
ported to the Data Protection Official for Research in
Norway in accordance with notification requirements.
Two questions were asked about respondents’ pre-
adapted preferences for payment systems (prior to their
entry into regular medical work). The first question was,
“Which payment system would you prefer if you were to
work as a GP and had a free choice?” The response op-
tions were (a) fixed salary, (b) activity-based income
(that is, current system), (c) a combination in which a
percentage is fixed and the rest is activity based and (d)
don’t know. Those who opted for the combined system
were asked a follow-up question including an open space
to fill in their preferred fixed-salary percentage.
The subsequent question was, “Which payment system
would you prefer if you were to work as a hospital doc-
tor and had a free choice?” The response options were
1) current payment system (relatively low base salary but
possibility for relatively high total income depending onadditional irregular working hours), (b) a shift towards a
higher base salary and less weight on additional pay
from irregular working hours, (c) fixed salary with nor-
mal working hours (8 a.m. to 4 p.m.) and (d) don’t know.
Prior to these questions, respondents were informed (or
reminded) about the nature of the current payment sys-
tems in hospitals and general practice.
While not explicitly mentioned in the wording of the
questions, it was implicit that the average payment level
would be the same across payment systems. All respondents
were expected to understand that by definition the payment
range would be larger under variable payment systems.
The answers to these two questions were expected to
depend on differences in respondent characteristics such
as gender and family situation (marital status and having
children), as well as differences in personality traits such
as prestige orientation, risk attitude and orientation to-
wards high income, status and work efforts.
Prestige orientation
From a list of 30 different specialities and subspecialities
[40], subjects were asked to indicate which ones they were
considering. In the analyses, the specialities were ranked in
accordance with their prestige index [37], from which the
mean index of the alternatives indicated was calculated.
The mean value, ranging from 1.5 to 22, was used as a
measure of respondents’ prestige orientation: the higher
the value, the more prestige-oriented is the respondent.
Risk attitude
Respondents’ risk attitude was measured by six risk-
related items from the Jackson personality inventory-
revised [41], adapted and validated by Pearson et al. [42]:
1. I enjoy taking risks
2. I try to avoid situations that have uncertain
outcomes
3. Taking risks does not bother me if gains involved are
high
4. I consider security an important element in every
aspect of my life
5. People have told me that I seem to enjoy taking
chances
6. I rarely, if ever, take risks when there is another
alternative.
These items have been used in several studies of med-
ical decision making [43-46]. The respondent scored all
items on a Likert scale from strong disagreement (1) to
strong agreement (6). The average scores of these six
items made an index ranging from 1 (very risk-averse) to
5.3 (very risk-seeking). In the construction of the risk at-
titude index, statements 2, 4 and 6 were reversely re-
corded. The higher this index, the more risk-prone.
















Total 16.6 48.6 19.7 15.1 100 829
Male 21.0 50.6 17.2 11.2 100 338 0.002
Female 13.5 47.3 21.4 17.8 100 490
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Preferences for high income, status and work-pace toler-
ance were measured using statements with which respon-
dents were asked to state their level of agreement on a six-
point Likert scale ranging from strong disagreement (1) to
strong agreement (6). The wordings of these statements
were, “It is important for me to have a high income”, “I
want a job that gives me a high status among other doctors”
and “I am happy with a high work pace”. For analysis pur-
poses, the ordinal values 1 to 6 were treated as an interval
scale, assuming it to be a reasonable approximation [47].
Data analyses
The data were initially analysed by frequency counts, con-
tingency tables, means and medians. A chi-square test was
used to establish whether there were significant gender
differences in the preferred payments systems. Statistical
tests with P values less than 0.05 are interpreted as a sign
of statistically significant results. One-way ANOVA was
used to test for differences in respondent characteristics
among the groups giving different answers to the two
main questions analysed. Multinomial logistic regression
analysis [48,49] was then used to profile respondents who
preferred another payment system to the current system
in hospital and general practices. SPSS version 22.0 was
used to perform the statistical analyses.
Results
A total of 831 persons (53%) responded. The gender bal-
ance was identical to that in the invited sample. We have
no reason to anticipate biases in the sample regarding
gender, age and place of living. However, like in surveys
more generally, we cannot preclude the possibility of
self-selection related to some “hidden” preferences of
relevance to the issues under consideration.
Table 1 provides respondent characteristics: mean age
of 28.4 years, 59% female and 54% having a familyTable 1 Respondent characteristics, total sample
n
Age, mean (range) 28.4 (23–53) 818
Gender, male 41% 830
Married/cohabiting 53% 830
Have children 21% 829
Family, that is, married/cohabiting
and/or have children
54% 829
Personality traits Mean (range) Median
Prestige score 9.5 (1.5–22) 9 804
Risk-prone index 2.9 (1–5.3) 2.8 816
Status-oriented 2.5 (1–6) 2 830
Income-oriented 4.2 (1–6) 4 828
Effort-tolerant 4.1 (1–6) 4 828(defined as married/cohabiting (53%) and/or having chil-
dren (21%)).
The mean (and median) prestige score is quite low
and reflects that the majority (55%) of respondents had
indicated general practice (prestige index 4) as one alter-
native speciality. On average, the respondent indicated
3.2 specialities. The risk-prone index suggests a normal
distribution (17% scored 1 standard deviation (SD)
below the mean, while 18% scored 1 SD above the
mean). The average respondent did not seem very con-
cerned about achieving a high status among other doc-
tors. The average respondent did, however, appear to be
more oriented towards achieving a high income and to
tolerate a high work pace.
Is there a gender difference in payment system
preferences?
Tables 2 and 3 present the three different payment sys-
tems we investigated, in hospitals and general practice,
respectively, in accordance with their degrees of income
predictability or certainty. While fixed salary is the pay-
ment system that by definition provides a predictable in-
come, the current payment systems involve uncertainty.
The “combined systems” were presented as compromise
alternatives, involving a higher proportion of predictable
fixed income.
Interestingly, the current payment systems were the
least preferred, both in hospitals (16.6%) and in gen-
eral practice (19.7%). The most preferred payment
system in hospitals (48.6%) would be one with a
higher proportion of fixed income (that is, fewer in-
centives for working irregular hours), while the most
preferred payment system (47.9%) in general practice
was the one combining activity-based payment with


















Total 19.7 47.9 20.4 12.1 100 829
Men 27.7 50.1 14.2 8.0 100 339 <0.001
Female 14.1 46.4 24.7 14.7 100 489
Table 4 Differences in payment system preferences in











Gender (1 = male) 0.52 0.42 0.36 0.30 828 0.002
Family (1 = yes) 0.43 0.57 0.61 0.50 828 0.009
Prestige score 10.56 9.90 8.24 8.54 802 <0.001
Risk-prone index 3.09 2.91 2.82 2.83 814 0.034
Status-oriented 2.64 2.58 2.38 2.46 828 0.244
Income-oriented 3.99 4.39 4.08 3.98 826 <0.001
Effort-tolerant 4.44 4.25 3.70 3.85 826 <0.001
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age of fixed salary, which ranged from 25% to 80%
(mean 57.6%, median 50%). The “fixed salary” option
achieved similar relative support both in hospital and
in general practice.
The results in Tables 2 and 3 indicate that young fe-
male and male doctors have significantly different pay-
ment system preferences: Women prefer even less
income variability than men. This difference is particu-
larly apparent in their preferences for payment systems
in general practice.Who are attracted to which payment system in hospitals?
Table 4 reports the binary one-way ANOVA analyses
comparing the mean values of various respondent char-
acteristics attracted by the different hospital payment
systems. There are statistically significant differences re-
lated to gender, family situation, prestige orientation, risk
attitude, income orientation and effort tolerance. These
binary analyses confirm that the more certainty there is
in the payment system, the more it appeals to women
and to respondents with a family. That is also the caseTable 5 Multinomial logistic regression analysis of preferred
Odds r
Combined system n = 386 Fixe
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male) 0.76 (0.50–1.16) 0.58
Family (0 = no, 1 = yes) 1.70 (1.13–2.57)* 1.72
Prestige score 0.98 (0.94–1.03) 0.93
Risk-prone index 0.98 (0.94–1.02) 0.99
Status-oriented Not included Not
Income-oriented 1.43 (1.19–1.72)*** 1.25
Effort-tolerant 0.84 (0.69–1.02) 0.61
Model fit information Cox and Snell R2 = 0.113, Nagelkerke R2
aStatistically significant: *: P < 0.05; **: P < 0.01; ***: P < 0.001.among those who are less prestige-oriented, less risk-
tolerant and less effort-tolerant.
Table 5 shows the result of a multinomial logistic re-
gression analysis elucidating the profiles of respondents
who preferred a different payment system in hospitals to
the current one. The analysis only includes the statisti-
cally significant respondent characteristics from Table 4.
Compared with those preferring the current payment
system, those preferring a combined system are more
likely to have a family and be income-oriented. Those
preferring fixed salary are more likely to be women and
have a family. Furthermore, they are much less tolerant
of a high work pace, are less concerned about prestige
and seem to be slightly more income-oriented.
Interestingly, the two tables indicate that the group that
responded “don’t know” to which hospital payment sys-
tem it preferred has similar respondent characteristics and
personality traits to those of the “fixed salary” group.Who are attracted to which payment system in general
practice?
Table 6 reports the binary one-way ANOVA analyses
comparing the mean values of various characteristics of
respondents attracted by the different payment systems
in general practice. There are statistically significant dif-
ferences between the groups related to gender, risk atti-
tude, status, income and effort. Again, the analyses
confirm that the more certainty there is in the payment
system, the more it appeals to women and those with
low risk tolerance. Those most concerned with status
and having a high income preferred the current activity-
based payment system; the same was true for those with
tolerance for a high work pace.
Table 7 shows the result of a multinomial logistic re-
gression analysis elucidating the profiles of respondents
who preferred a different payment system in general
practice to the current one. The analysis only includes
the statistically significant characteristics from Table 2 ashospital remuneration system
atio (95% CI)a
d salary n = 149 Don’t know n = 117 Current n = 131








Table 6 Differences in payment system preferences in












Gender (1 = male) 0.58 0.43 0.28 0.27 828 <0.001
Family (1 = yes) 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.59 828 0.937
Prestige score 9.67 9.78 8.95 9.43 789 0.129
Risk-prone index 3.07 2.95 2.69 2.84 814 <0.001
Status-oriented 2.85 2.56 2.29 2.42 828 0.001
Income-oriented 4.60 4.25 3.92 3.88 826 <0.001
Effort-tolerant 4.52 4.13 3.80 3.93 826 <0.001
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current payment system, those preferring the other sys-
tems are likely to be women, less income-oriented and
less effort-tolerant.
Similar to Tables 4 and 5, when looking at the charac-
teristics of the “don’t know” group in Tables 6 and 7, re-
spondents have a profile quite similar to those who
prefer a fixed salary.
Discussion
This study supports the views expressed among young
doctors in many countries that an activity-based pay-
ment system in general practice and a hospital payment
system that disproportionately rewards long and irregu-
lar working hours do not correspond with their prefer-
ences. Only 16.6% of those entering the medical
profession in Norway prefer the current payment system
in hospitals (low base salary and high compensation for
long and irregular working hours). In general practice,
the current payment system involving a blend of fee-for-
service and capitation was preferred by 19.7%.
Interestingly, the even lower support for the current
payment system in hospitals suggests that a system withTable 7 Multinomial logistic regression analysis of preferred
Odds ratio (95
Combined n = 390 Salary n = 1
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male) 0.59 (0.40–0.88)** 0.39 (0.24–0.6
Family (0 = no, 1 = yes) Not included Not included
Prestige score Not included Not included
Risk-prone index 1.01 (0.97–1.02) 0.97 (0.92–1.0
Status-oriented 0.96 (0.82–1.11) 0.90 (0.75–1.1
Income-oriented 0.79 (0.65–0.95)* 0.65 (0.51–0.8
Effort-tolerant 0.74 (0.62–0.89)** 0.65 (0.52–0.8
Model fit information Cox and Snell R2 = 0.114, Nagelkerke R2
aStatistically significant: *: P < 0.05; **: P < 0.01; ***: P < 0.001.an increasing marginal compensation for long hours is
even less popular than one with constant marginal com-
pensation for increased hours, like the activity-based sys-
tem used for GPs. While increasing marginal rewards is
an efficient way of inducing labour supply (in that the
substitution effect trumps the income effect), it might
still be considered unpopular because it puts further
pressure to divert from a work–life balance preferred by
the new generation of doctors, in particular women and
those having a family.
The results clearly show that young doctors prefer
payment systems that provide a more predictable in-
come. This is emphasized by the fact that the “fixed sal-
ary” option received slightly higher supports than the
current systems. The most preferred payment models
were hybrids between the current systems and fixed sal-
ary. The popularity of these hybrid models might reflect
a perception that they involve less uncertainty and pres-
sure, while the total payment remains the same.
As expected, there are significant gender differences in
payment system preferences. Women have a stronger
preference for a more predictable income, particularly in
general practice. Only half as many women compared to
men prefer the current GP remuneration system (14.1%
vs 27.7%). Having a family was a significant determinant
for explaining variations in preferences for payment sys-
tems in hospitals. Briscoe [50] points out that doctors
who are also primary caregivers saddle with responsibil-
ities associated with both their families and their pa-
tients. Situations that require flexibility to decide when
and for how long to engage in work activity are likely to
arise in both spheres.
This survey provides support for the idea that different
payment systems attract people with different personal-
ity traits. Young doctors with an affinity for prestigious
medical specialities are those who are most in favour of
the current payment system in hospitals. Success within
a prestigious speciality is associated with long working
hours, which may explain why prestige-oriented younggeneral practice remuneration system
% CI)a
63 Don’t know n = 96 Current (activity-based) n = 160
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tion, described as working normal hours from 8 a.m. to
4 p.m.
While differences in prestige orientation did not
affect preferences for GP payment systems, so did dif-
ferences in status orientation. The more status-
oriented you are, the more income variability in gen-
eral practice you accept. However, status orientation
did not explain differences in preferences for hospital
payment systems.
As expected, risk-prone respondents were more pre-
pared to accept income variability. The income-oriented
respondents showed a significantly stronger affinity for
the current activity-based payment system in general
practice. Finally, the variable “effort-tolerant” was signifi-
cant for explaining preference variations for payment
systems in both hospitals and general practice. The more
you dislike having to work at a high pace, the more you
would like a payment system with a predictable income.
The aversion towards the current payment systems, as
measured by the support for the contrasting alternative
(fixed salary), appears to be strongest in general practice.
The reason might be that the current activity-based sys-
tem for GPs is fundamentally different from the current
salary-based system in hospitals in terms of income pre-
dictability and certainty. The current activity-based sys-
tem for GPs results in poorer earnings if you are unable
to maintain activity at a high level. This element of indi-
vidual risk accentuates by the fact that GPs themselves
are responsible for arranging their own pensions and
sick-leave insurance. Hospital doctors, in contrast, have
a base salary and are included in the public social secur-
ity system. Thus, becoming a GP appears to involve
more of a commitment than becoming a hospital doctor.
One might argue that it does not really matter what
young physician initially think about the payment sys-
tems because they will adapt to the systems as soon as
they become part of them. However, cross-sectional
studies among experienced Norwegian GPs show that
one in two prefers a different payment system from their
current one and that this proportion has increased sig-
nificantly over the last couple of years [51,52]. Rather
than their current activity-based system, one in three
would prefer a fixed salary. The study shows that phy-
sicians do not necessarily learn to adapt to the exist-
ing payment system and that there is a significant
mismatch among those who have had many years to
adapt. Similar studies among experienced Norwegian
hospital doctors about their views on the existing pay-
ment system have not been found. This calls for fur-
ther research. Halvorsen et al. [51] point out that the
ability to focus on patients’ needs may also play a sig-
nificant role in the formation of payment system
preferences.Should young doctors’ payment system preferences be
taken into account?
An optimal payment system in the health sector is that
which best contributes to improving patients’ health, not
the utility (or income) of doctors. If it in addition keeps
the costs down, it certainly would be preferred from a
political point of view. In principle, one may therefore
find it neither surprising nor worrisome that young doc-
tors display some degree of dissatisfaction with the
current payment systems. The result might rather sug-
gest that policy makers are adequately protecting pa-
tients’ interests by “imposing” high effort on doctors and
monitoring their actions. However, if doctors’ dissatisfac-
tion reduces their motivation, this may have negative
consequences for the quality of care provided and pos-
sibly also for recruitment and retention. In negotiating
proper payment systems, health authorities should not
only care about physicians’ productivity but also the im-
pact on continuity of patient care. Contract type is
known to be one of many factors that influence recruit-
ment and retention [53,54]. There is also evidence sug-
gesting that specific initiatives reducing workload as
such are effective [55,56].
Designing payment systems to satisfy effort-intolerant
workers might be seen as a risk of productivity reduc-
tion. Theories on economic incentives suggest that a
lack of activity-based payment will lead to shirking [57],
meaning that unless incentives induce people to work,
they are expected to devote minimum effort. There are,
however, other theories about professions and public
service motivation, as well as empirical evidence indicat-
ing that behaviour and performance among health pro-
fessionals are determined by aspects beyond financial
incentives [58-60]. Green [60] finds that physicians are
intrinsically motivated to provide high quality care and
warns that relying exclusively on extrinsic incentives is
detrimental to the quality of care and costly for the
health care industry.
The fact that young female doctors have signifi-
cantly different preferences for payment systems than
males also represents a policy challenge given the
new gender balance in medicine. There are no obvi-
ous reasons why policy makers would wish to main-
tain payment systems that might create gender
imbalance in certain types of sectors or specialities.
To the extent that recruitment and retention of doc-
tors, as well as more integrated care, are important
policy goals, our findings suggest that health author-
ities may do well in supplementing the “prehistoric”
remuneration systems for doctors by offering more
payment system diversity. This is in line with re-
vealed preferences and developments in other coun-
tries. The young generation of physicians in France
demands a larger choice of payment schemes. Choice
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can choose between capitation and FFS payments.
Similarly, in the Canadian Province of Quebec, spe-
cialists can choose between FFS and a mixed payment
scheme (part FFS, part capitation) [61].
Allard et al. [61] examine the consequences of
allowing physicians to self-select into FFS or capita-
tion payment schemes in a setting where GPs act as
gatekeepers to specialized care. If the main concern is
to reduce the specialized care costs, it is optimal from
the regulator’s perspective to pay all GPs on a FFS
basis and not let them choose the payment scheme. If
the main concern is quality of health outcome, the
answer depends on the GP’s ability. With mainly
high-ability GPs, self-selection of a payment is opti-
mal. On the opposite, with mainly low-ability GPs,
capitation is optimal.
Conclusion
The vast majority of young doctors prefer payment sys-
tems that are less activity-based and puts less pressure
on working long and irregular hours than do the current
contracts offered in the Norwegian health service. There
are reasons to expect recruitment and retention might
improve in the less prestigious medical specialities if the
new generation of doctors had the opportunity to choose
a payment system that corresponds with their diverse
preferences.
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